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NOTES
NOTES
ACTIONS TO RECOVER CHATTELS IN MISSOURI
THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The purpose of this note is to state the general rules applicable
in Missouri in litigation concerning the right to possession of
specific chattels. The problem involves the investigation of the
modern statutory counterpart of the common law actions of
replevin and detinue. It will be remembered that whenever a
question arose at common law over the right to recover a specific
chattel, the action in which the litigation would proceed would
be either replevin or detinue.' For this reason, it may be worth-
while to refresh the reader's mind with the capabilities and limi-
tations of those two common law actions. A review of the two
actions will conduce to a better understanding of Missouri law
regarding the claim and delivery of personal property, because
Missouri's statutes dealing with the recovery of such property
include the substantive law of replevin and detinue, stripped of
their arbitrary rules concerning pleading and procedure. Indeed
-today's more liberal procedure aside-not much more can be
done under Missouri's statutes dealing with this subject than
was possible under the combined actions t common law.
The three most common situations in which a person might
have the right to possession of a specific chattel are (1) where
defendant takes the property from the plaintiff wrongfully; (2)
where defendant wrongfully detains the property, though he
somehow came into possession thereof rightfully;2 (3) where
plaintiff contracts to purchase the property from the defendant.
In the first situation-wrongful or trespassory taking-replevin
1. An occasional exception arose when equity intervened in unusual cases
in order to assure the plaintiff absolutely of securing the chattel he sought
-cases wherein the chattel had a unique, intrinsic value to the plaintiff,
which value was not susceptible of an objective valuation. In such cases,
both replevin and detinue were inadequate, for in detinue the defendant
always had the option to pay the value rather than to return the property,
while reqlevin, though theoreically giving to, the plaintiff the sole option
of recovering the chattel in specie, actually gave no such absolute choice
since there was nothing to prevent the defendant from hiding or otherwise
disposing of the chattel and, upon losing the litigation, paying the value.
2. Of course, the recovery of a trust res would fall within this category.
The law of trusts, however, includes principles peculiar to that subject and
to the equity courts, and, though the rules of trusts often cut across the
law of recovery of personal property, the author has omitted from this paper
any discussion of the law concerning the recovery of a trust res.
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was the proper remedy, for as finally developed at common law,
replevin lay only for the recovery of goods wrongfully taken
from the plaintiff's possession. Early Missouri cases followed
this "trespassory taking" rule in replevin actions." Replevin was
thus delictual in nature and origin. Born of the landlord's right
of distraint over his tenant's chattels, replevin soon developed
into an action in which the plaintiff posted bond to indemnify
the sheriff and the defendant and immediately secured possession
of the property in controversy, the right to possession being liti-
gated thereafter in the suit.'
For the latter two situations, where the original taking was
rightful but the defendant refused on demand to return the
property, and where the plaintiff contracted to purchase the
chattel, detinue was the proper remedy. Detinue, unlike replevin,
was contractual in origin and nature, being an offspring of the
action of debt. At a very early date, it was held that detinue
would lie for a chattel which had never been in the possession
of the plaintiff, he having contracted merely to purchase the
same from defendant.5 Detinue, of course, differed from replevin
in two major ways. In detinue, the property remained in posses-
sion of the defendant until after the litigation decided the right
thereto in plaintiff, while in replevin the plaintiff might have
the property at the beginning of the suit by filing bond. Again,
in detinue the defendant had the option of returning the chattel
or paying the value thereof, while in replevin, theoretically at
least, the plaintiff might demand the chattel in specie.0
Replevin and detinue made their exit in Missouri along with
other common law forms of action in 18497 and the substantive
law covering these two actions was combined into what is com-
3. Chevalier v. Little, 1 Mo. 345 (1823).
4. No bond was required at first but by 2 GEO. 1, c. 19, § 23, a bond was
required with two sureties in the amount of double the value of the property
about to be replevied, conditioned to prosecute the suit with effect and with-
out delay and for a return of the property if it be so adjudged. For a
historical discussion of the bond requirement, see WELLS, A TREATISE ON
E LAW OF REaWvN (1880) 385. The Missouri statute regarding this
bond requirement has departed little from the above ancient provisions.
Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1798 (1939).
5. In 1442, Fortescue, C.J., laid down the law "that if I buy a horse of
-you, now the property in the horse is in me; and for that you shall have
a writ in debt for the price, and I shall have detinue for the horse upon
the bargain. Y.B. 20 Henry VI (1442). See KmGwIN, CASES IN COMMON
LAw PLEADING § 40 (2d ed. 1934).
6. For an excellent comparison of detinue and replevin at common law,
'see Dame v. Dame, 43 N.H. 37 (1861).
7. Mo. LAws 1849, p. 73.
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monly referred to as the statutory "claim and delivery" of per-
sonal property., The statutes united the capabilities of each
action and, in some instances, adopted the limitations existing in
them at common law. Except for a few modifications and addi-
tions which will be referred to as the discussion proceeds, the
statutes covering the subject today are substantially the same
as those enacted over a hundred years ago. The statutes are to
the greatest extent like replevin. They are similar to replevin in
that the plaintiff can, upon furnishing bond, secure possession
of the property at the beginning of the suit. Also, the judgment
is, in the first instance, that the property be returned in specie,
or if that cannot be done, that the defendant pay the value
thereof at the election of the plaintiff. But they are like detinue
in that recovery may be had under them even where the original
taking by the defendant was rightful, the detention alone being
wrongful. For the most part, the statutes appear to be merely
a codification of common law replevin with the principle bor-
rowed from detinue that recovery can be had where the original
taking is rightful. Indeed, the courts still speak of actions to
recover personal property as "replevin," while very few cases
have mentioned detinue since the form was abolished in 1849.9
Even the statutes today refer in the alternative to "replevin,"
and the titles of the chapters in which the statutes are found
are Replevin in Courts of Record or Replevin in Justice Courts.
The same privilege will be availed of here, and henceforward
reference to the statutory actions will be made as "replevin."
The Missouri statutes dealing with replevin consist of approxi-
mately fifty sections. Revised Statutes Missouri 1939, sections
1788 to 1811 deal with replevin in courts of record, while sections
2934 through 2958 cover the action instituted in justice courts.
Except for rules of procedure, the two different categories are
substantially the same. Only one surety on the bond is required
for the action in justice courts while two are required in courts
of record. Of course, the jurisdiction of the justice courts over
replevin is fixed by the value of the property and the size of the
city in which the action is instituted.0 Since, in substance, the
8. The first statutes covering claim and delivery of personal property
after the abolition of the old forms of action were sections 1 through 9,
Mo. LAws 1849, art. 1, p. 82.
9. Moore v. Chamberlain, 15 Mo. 238 (1849).
10. Before the justice courts can exercise jurisdiction in replevin actions,
Washington University Open Scholarship
556 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
rules are the same, no distinction between the two groups of
statutes will hereinafter be made unless specifically necessary.
Where it has been necessary to refer to the statutes for illustra-
tive purposes, those statutes dealing with replevin in courts of
record have been used.
Under the replevin statutes, the plaintiff must bring his suit
in the county in which the property is situated.1 He may proceed
in either of two ways. He may allow the defendant to remain
in possession of the property during the suit, or he may procure
the sheriff to deliver the property to him at the institution of
the suit and the right to possession will then be decided in the
subsequent litigation. If the latter course is pursued, the plaintiff
must file an affidavit with his petition stating that he is either the
owner of the property in controversy or is lawfully entitled to
the possession thereof ;12 that the defendant wrongfully detains
the property; the actual value thereof ;13 that the property has
not been seized under any process, execution or attachment
against the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff will be in danger of
losing the property unless it be taken from the defendant imme-
diately.14 After filing the affidavit, the plaintiff must then file
a bond with two sureties stating that they are bound to the
defendant in double the value of the property as stated in the
affidavit, for the prosecution of the suit with effect and without
the value stated in the affidavit plus the damages claimed must be less than$350.00 in counties or cities of over 50,000 population; in counties or cities
having less than 50,000 population, such value and damages must be less
than $250.00. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2934 (1939).
11. Mo. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 1811 (1939).
12. Just how a party becomes lawfully entitled to the possession of the
property is often hard to determine. The problem involves the question of
the quantum of title required, for instance, and also the question whether
an executory contract entitles the vendee to "lawful possession." These
problems are discussed in a subsequent part.
13. But the plaintiff is not bound by the value stated in his affidavit since
the only purpose is for fixing the amount of the bond and not for the sub-
sequent assessment of the actual value by the jury. Ferguson v. Comfort,
184 S.W. 1192 (Mo. App. 1916).
14. Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1811 (1939): "If the plaintiff claim in his
petition the possession of specific personal property, he may, at the time of
filing his petition, or at any other time afterward, before the rendition ofjudgment in the cause, file his affidavit, or the affidavit of some other person
in his behalf, showing: first, that the plaintiff is the owner of the property
claimed, sufficiently describing it, or is lawfully entitled to the possession
thereof; second, that it is wrongfully detained by the defendant; third, the
actual value thereof; fourth, that the same has not been seized under any
process, execution or attachment against the property of the plaintiff; and,
fifth, that the plaintiff will be in danger of losing his said property, unless
it be taken, out of the possession of the defendant, or otherwise secured."
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delay, for the return of the property to the defendant if such be
adjudged and for the payment of the assessed value, damages for
the taking and detention, and the costs of the suit.15 Having
taken these steps, the plaintiff is then entitled to the possession
of the property and the sheriff will take it from the defendant,
deliver it to the plaintiff and the litigation then proceeds. The
right of the plaintiff to take the property at the beginning of the
suit is absolute if the defendant took the property from plaintiff's
possession wrongfully.16 If, however, the original acquisition
of the property by the defendant was not wrongful, he may retain
the property during the suit by filing a bond similar to that
required of the plaintiff wherein he binds himself and his sureties
to the plaintiff for double the value of the property and the
damages assessed in case he loses the litigation which follows.',
The litigation then proceeds to find the party entitled to the pos-
session of the property and judgment is rendered for that party
to retain or recover the possession of the property, together with
any damages he has suffered from the taking and detention, or
the dentention alone where the original taking was rightful.
While the parties are thus in possession of the property under
the delivery bonds, the property is said to be in custoda legis
and the parties are not supposed to dispose of it until final judg-
ment is rendered. 8 Practically, however, there is nothing to
15. Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1790 (1939): "The sheriff shall not receive
such property until the plaintiff shall deliver to him a bond, executed by
two or more sufficient sureties, approved by the sheriff, to the effect that
they are bound to the defendant in double the value of the property stated
in the affidavit, for the prosecution of the suit with effect and without delay,
for the return of the property to the defendant, if return thereof be ad-judged, and, in default of such delivery, for the payment of the assessed
value of such property, and for the payment of all damages for the taking
and detention thereof, and for all costs which may accrue in the action."
16. Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1790 (1939): "If the plaintiff shall state in
the affidavit made by him, as provided by section 1788, that the property
was wrongfully taken, and that his right of action accrued within one year,
the defendant shall not be entitled to retain such property by giving bond,
as provided by section 1791, but the same shall be delivered to the plaintiff
upon his giving bond required."
17. The bonds filed under the statute do not authorize the recovery of
double damages. The amount is fixed at the double value to secure the
winning party for any additional damages over and above the value of the
property. To fix the bond at the mere value would not secure the party
for the added damages. Collins v. Hough, 26 Mo. 149 (1858). As previously
noted, no bond is necessary in the replevin suit at all since the plaintiff may
proceed without first securing possession of the property. Hamilton v.
Clark, 25 Mo. App. 428 (1887).
18. Mohr v. Langan, 162 Mo. 474, 63 S.W. 409 (1901).
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prevent either party from disposing of the property pending the
outcome of the suit since he has absolute control over it, and
since his only penalty will be that, in the event he loses in the
subsequent litigation, he will be adjudged liable for the value of
the property. The statute in this connection says that the judg-
ment shall be for a return of the property or the payment of the
value assessed at the election of the prevailing ptrty.-1 But, if
the losing party has already sold or otherwise disposed of the
property, the "election" given to the prevailing party becomes
meaningless and he must be satisfied with the assessed value of
the property instead of the chattel itself. It is often said that
a party who disposes of the property pending the suit is guilty
of a conversion and is liable on that basis.20 As will be pointed
out in a subsequent part of this paper, where the property which
the losing party has disposed of has a use value, to hold that
he will be liable for a conversion of the property would really
reward the party for disposing of the property since it is usually
possible to recover more in a replevin action involving property
with a use value than in an action of trover involving the same
type of property. The possibility of a greater measure of dam-
ages results from the rule that damages for the loss of use of
the property are not awarded in trover. The courts seem to
realize this possibility, however, and even those giving lip-service
to the rule nevertheless go ahead and award use damages for
the property if such damages are proper. Where the party who
disposes of the property pending suit goes ahead and wins in
the litigation, no such question arises, of course. In such case,
the fact that he has already disposed of the property does not
prevent him from collecting the proper damages from the losing
party for the taking and the detention of the property.21
It has been suggested that the statutory bond requirement, in
furnishing security to the party out of possession of the prop-
erty, silently acquiesces in the disposal of the property as the
party in possession may see fit.22 This conclusion appears logical
when we consider that the only penalty imposed is that the party
makes himself liable for the value of the property. The argument
in favor of the proposition becomes more logical when it is re-
19. Mo. Rzv. STAT. ANN . §§ 1799, 1801.
20. Ely v. Sutton, 177 Mo. App. 546 (1913).
21. Donohue v. McAleer, 37 Mo. App. 312 (1866).
22. WELLS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REPLEVIN § 480 (1880).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss4/4
NOTES
membered that certain types of property could not be retained
until the outcome of the litigation. For instance, if the property
involved is of a perishable nature, it would be unreasonable to
require the party in possession to hold it, taking the chance that
it might spoil. In such a case, he would not be relieved from
liability for the value of the property. A similar situation might
arise in the case of property which fluctuates in market value.
In such cases the party in possession ought to be able to take
advantage of a substantial rise in value and dispose of the
property, especially since he might be held liable for a substan-
tial fall in market value.2 3
At any rate, the alternative judgment will be framed just as
though the property had not been disposed of.24 It will be that
the prevailing party, if he is not in possession of the property
at time of the judgment, recover the property, or the assessed
value thereof at his election, together with all damages suffered
as a result of the taking and/or detention by the other party.25
Missouri thus uses an alternative judgment which is contrary to
the general rule in the United States that the losing party may
insist on a return of the property instead of paying the value
thereof. The argument for the general rule is that a person
should not be compelled against his will to purchase property
he does not desire. However, the very suit in which he is en-
gaged attests that he has asserted ownership of the goods, and
when it is found that such assertion was without foundation, his
possession is obviously wrongful. There should, therefore, be no
hesitation in requiring him to pay the value of the property if
plaintiff so elects.
The question is settled in Missouri, however, by the statute
which gives to the prevailing party the sole choice as to whether
he will take the property or its value. And he need not make
this election until the property is delivered over to the sheriff for
the purpose of returning it to him. The winner may go to the
sheriff's office, look over the property and decide at that time
whether he wants it or its value.28 The alternative judgment is
23. Rosenblatt v. Winstanley, 186 S.W. 542 (Mo. App. 1916).
24. Western Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Glasner, 169 Mo. 38, 68 S.W.
917 (1902). Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1801 (1939).
25. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1799 (1939).
26. Hanlon v. O'Keefe, 55 Mo. App. 528 (1893); Mo. Rav. STAT. ANN.
§ 1802 (1939).
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rendered either as a result of a trial of the issues by the court
or jury, or as the result of a summary judgment against the
plaintiff for failing, after having taken the property under the
bond, to prosecute the suit "with effect and without delay." In
other words, the plaintiff in replevin who has taken possession
of the property under the statutory bond may not take a volun-
tary non-suit. If he does, it will be treated as a default and the
same judgment for a return of the property or its value, together
with damages, may be rendered against him as if the suit had
been contested in court and a verdict rendered against him.27
Under the statutes, as at common law, the successful party may
recover that part of the property sued for which can be found
and the value of that which cannot be found.28
In order to maintain replevin in Missouri, the defendant must
have been in possession of the property at the time the suit was
commenced.29 There really seems to be no compelling reason
for this rule in view of the statutory alternative judgment which
allows the plaintiff to elect the value of the goods rather than the
property itself. Further, there is little or no distinction between
a disposition of the property after filing the petition in replevin
and a disposition of it prior to commencement of the suit, yet in
the former instance, the action of replevin proceeds and the pre-
vailing party is awarded judgment much as if the property were
before the court. Many jurisdictions have no such requirement.
In New Jersey, for instance, it is not necessary that the defen-
dant be in possession of the property at the time the suit is com-
menced.30 Even at common law, it appears that from the very
beginning, there was no requirement that the defendant be in
possession at the time suit is commenced, the action being main-
tainable for damages or value alone.3' In Missouri, the courts
apparently reason that when the defendant has disposed of the
property prior to the institution of the suit, an action in the
nature of trover for a conversion of. the property is the proper
procedure. But, as already noted, where the property is valuable
27. Smith v. Winston, 10 Mo. 299 (1847).
28. Swafford Bros. Dry Goods Co. v. Jacobs, 66 Mo. App. 362 (1896).
29. Gulath v. Waldstein, 7 Mo. App. 66 (1879); Penn v. Brashear, 65
Mo. App. 24 (1895); Myers v. Lingenfelter, 81 Mo. App. 251 (1899);
Dewolff v. Morino, 187 S.W. 620 (Mo. 1916).
30. Preziaso v. Union City Cleaning Co., 6 N.J. Misc. R. 171, 140 Atl.
394 (1928).
31. KEIGwIN, CAsEs IN COMMON LAW PLEADING § 56, n. 2 (2d ed. 1934).
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for its use, the defendant, by disposing of its prior to the suit
compels the plaintiff to proceed in trover and forces upon him a
remedy which permits smaller damages than replevin does. This
is true because damages for loss of use of property are not
awarded in trover. For the above reasons Missouri might well do
away with the requirement that the defendant be in possession
at the time an action in replevin is commenced, thus giving the
plaintiff the choice of whether he will proceed in replevin or
trover.
The statutes prescribe the proper course of litigation without
equivocation, and as a consequence the courts have not had much
trouble with the procedural problems. For many substantive
questions, however, the statutes are either silent or open to con-
struction, and these have given the courts much trouble. The
cases indicate that opinions differ widely as to just how the
following questions should be answered. What property is sub-
ject to an action of replevin? What title is required in plaintiff
to support replevin? How do the courts fix the "value" of the
property and the damages for the "taking and detention"? Can
the plaintiff ever be assured of obtaining the chattel itself in
replevin? No statute can answer all these questions, for the
facts of the cases in which they are discussed are as varied as
the cases themselves. No rules can be stated which are satis-
factory for all cases. Rather, it is hoped that from a review of
the cases in Missouri covering the subject, broad general rules
will emerge which will allow a reasonably accurate prediction
as to what course the courts will follow when called upon to
decide the numerous issues arising in any replevin suit.
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO REPLEVIN
The general rule is that any personal property, not attached
to the realty, which is susceptible of identification for purposes
of description required in the affidavit, and which has not been
attached in any legal process against the plaintiff,32 may be the
subject matter of a replevin suit.33 As with all general rules,
however, this one breaks down in certain specific applications.
For instance, the question often arises when property is suffi-
32. Note that this requirement would prohibit successive replevin suits
involving the same property.
33. Gray v. Parker, 38 Mo. 160 (1866).
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ciently identifiable. In this connection, where mixed goods of the
same nature may be separated so that a division of equal value
can be made, such as with fungible goods, it is not necessary
that each unit be identified. Replevin will lie for a part of a
mass of fungible goods."' Such instances often furnish an excep-
tion to the general rule that replevin will not lie in favor of one
tenant in common against another. 35 The property must be
susceptible of seizure by the sheriff,8 and under this rule it has.
been held, for instance, that replevin will not lie for a coffin
containing a body which has already been interred. 7
Missouri follows the universal rule that money may not be
the subject matter of replevin unless it can be set aside and
marked in some manner so as to render it identifiable.3 8 But the
action will lie to recover possession of a check, a promissory note
or other choses in action. 9 Trees severed from the realty may
be recovered by the owner or possessor of the land in an action
of replevin.40 Growing crops, whether or not they have been
severed from the realty, and whether or not they have ceased
to take nutriment from the soil, are personalty and hence may
be replevied. 41
Interesting questions often arise concerning the right to pos-
session of after-acquired property under a mortgage. When the
property is the increase of mortgaged animals, the mortgage of
a domestic female animal covers the increase of such animal, and,
on default by the mortgagor, the mortgagee may rcover the
young animal along with its mother in an action of replevin.42
The reason assigned for the rule is that the increase of a female
animal belongs to the legal owner rather than to the possessor. 3
But it has been held that the rule does not apply unless the mort-
gage was made during the period of gestation."4 All the cases
dealing with this problem, however, are old decisions, and the
34. Kaufman v. Schilling, 58 Mo. 218 (1874); Schnabel v. Thomas, 98
Mo. App. 197, 71 S.W. 1076 (1903).
35. Hopson v. Pregree, 206 Mo. App. 28, 228 S.W. 859 (1920).
36. Jones v. Dodge, 61 Mo. 368 (1875).
37. Guthrie v. Weaver, 1 Mo. App. 136 (1876).
38. Hamilton v. Clark, 25 Mo. App. 428 (1887); Pilkington v. Trigg, 28
Mo. 95 (1859).
39. Steinbaum v. Wallace, 237 Mo. App. 841, 176 S.W.2d 683 (1944).
40. Lead Company v. White, 106 Mo. App. 222, 80 S.W. 356 (1904).
41. Garth v. Caldwell, 72 Mo. 622 (1880).
42. Rogers v. Gage, 59 Mo. App. 107 (1894).
43. White v. Storms, 21 Mo. App. 288 (1886).
44. Edmonton v. Wilson, 49 Mo. App. 491 (1892).
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problem doubtless would not arise today since the right to the
increase of mortgaged animals would probably be provided for
in the mortgage.
When the after-acquired property is something other than
animals, the courts seem to say that such property cannot be
recovered in an action of replevin,' 5 but they have nevertheless
proceeded to adjust all the rights to the property in the replevin
action anyway. In St. Louis Drug Company v. Robinson 6 the
defendant mortgaged store goods to the plaintiff with the under-
standing that the defendant was to remain in possession for the
purpose of selling them, but with the further stipulation that the
defendant would keep the stock at such a level as not to endanger
the security and that if he allowed the stock to decrease, the
plaintiff should have the right to possession. The defendant
allowed the goods to decrease and the court held that the plaintiff
could recover the remaining goods in replevin even though some
of the stock was not in the defendant's possession when the mort-
gage was made. A similar situation arose in Gregory v. Tav-
enner,'7 in which the defendant gave the plaintiff a lien on his
stock of merchandise or any additions thereto, to secure a run-
ning indebtedness. Plaintiff seized the goods under a replevin
bond from the defendant's assignee in bankruptcy. The trial
court ruled that replevin would not lie for such goods and held
that the defendant's assignee should recover the property or its
value. On appeal, however, the trial court was reversed, and
the court, though agreeing that replevin would not lie, ruled that
since the plaintiff did have an equitable lien on the goods, and
since law and equity in Missouri were fused, the equities of the
parties should be adjusted in the replevin suit. The appellate
court accordingly ruled that the defendant could recover the
property only by paying the plaintiff's lien or, if he elected to
take money instead of the property, only the amount by which
the value of the seized property exceeded the plaintiff's lien. This
procedure is identical with that followed in the case of ordinary
property in a replevin action when the defendant has a special
45. The reason most often assigned for the rule is that there has been
no prior possession of such property. Scudder v. Bailey, 66 Mo. App. 40(1896). But such a rule would prevent any mortgagee from recovering-
mortgaged property in replevin.
46. 81 Mo. 18 (1883).
47. 38 Mo. App. 627 (1890).
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property in the goods, such as a possessory lien. Thus, for all
practical purposes, it appears that replevin will lie for after-
acquired property in favor of a mortgagee.48 The principle seems
to arise from the recognition, that in Missouri, law and equity
are fused, and since it is well established that the mortgagee of
after-acquired property does acquire a valid equitable lien
thereon, the court might well adjust the rights of the parties
when the property has been seized by the plaintiff under the
replevin statutes.49
SUFFICIENCY OF PLAINTIFF'S TITLE TO SUPPORT REPLEVIN
Replevin based on a Piior naked possession.
It has been seen that the general owner of a chattel may obtain
the property in replevin without having prior possession of the
property. Thus, the mortgagee of a chattel has been allowed to
obtain possession of the property on default by the mortgagor. 0
Similarly, the vendee under a contract executed on his own side
may recover the property although he has never had possession
thereof.51 Conversely, when one has only a special interest in the
property, he must have had prior possession in order to main-
tain replevin. In the great majority of instances when a party
has a special property in a chattel it will be a possessory lien.
It would therefore be tautological to say that one having only a
special property in the goods must have had prior possession,
since a possessory lien presupposes prior possession.
The next question is whether a person with only a possessory
interest in a chattel can maintain replevin. By "possessory inter-
est" is meant that interest which a prior possession alone gives
to the possessor. The definition excludes both general and the
special property in the chattel. The answer will depend on the
48. Accord, Keating v. Hannenkamp, 100 Mo. 161, 13 S.W. 89 (1889);
Scott v. Soda Water Company, 134 Mo. App. 302 (1908). But cf. Scudder
v. Bailey, 66 Mo. App. 40 (1896) where the court said that a mortgagee
cannot maintain replevin for after-acquired property because he has never
been in possession thereof.
49. It is interesting to note the extent to which such reasoning departs
from the theory of the case, for even some of the more liberal code states
would look askance at giving the plaintiff equitable relief when the theory
under which he filed his suit was strictly legal. See, for instance, Jackson
v. Strong, 222 N. Y. 149, 118 N.E. 512 (1917), where the plaintiff asked for
equitable relief and, upon finding that he was not entitled to such relief,
was refused legal relief even though he was shown to be entitled to it.
50. Abington v. Steinberg, 86 Mo. App. 639 (1900).
51. Boutell v. Warne, 62 Mo. 350 (1876).
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question: "against whom is such person to prevail?" Naturally,
he could not maintain replevin against the general or special
owner of the property. There are two other classes of persons,
generally speaking, who might be involved-some person who
claims the property under the owner thereof, such as a finder,
a gratuitous bailee and the like, or someone who is, himself,
another bare possessor of the chattel. It is obvious that one
having a bare possession, and nothing more, could not prevail
against a party claiming under the true owner of the chattel.
The field is thus narrowed down so that the defendant must be
either a trespasser who himself has no interest in the property,
or a person who, though having no interest in the property,
somehow came by his possession rightfully, though the plaintiff
was in possession at a time prior to him. In Missouri, the plain-
tiff who claims under a naked, prior possession will prevail in
replevin against the former-that is, the trespasser-but not the
latter-the party who somehow came by his possession from the
plaintiff rightfully.
It is said, however, by various authorities that Missouri is
among about one-half of the jurisdictions in the United States
which hold that "bare possession alone is not sufficient to sup-
port an action of replevin. ' ' 52 Under this rule the defendant,
even though he be a wrongdoer, wins in the replevin suit by
showing that some third party has the general or special interest
in the property. In other words, it is said that the defendant in
such cases may set up the defense of jus tertii. Though, indeed,
there are Missouri cases which appear to stand for the bald prop-
osition that a peaceful possessor of a chattel may not recover
the property in replevin from a wrongdoer who takes the chattel
away from him, a close scrutiny of these cases reveals that there
was usually more involved than the rule under review. In Fowles
v. Bebee,53 the defendant took a cow from plaintiff's possession.
Plaintiff sued in replevin for recovery of the animal. The defen-
dant answered, claiming title in himself, but failing to prove it.
The court nevertheless found for the defendant, holding that
when the defendant put plaintiff's title in issue by claiming title
in himself, it became necessary for the plaintiff to show more
52. Gray v. Parker, 38 Mo. 160 (1866); Gartside v. Nixon, 43 Mo. 138
(1868). And see, 150 A.L.R. 192 et seq. for classifications of jurisdictions
adopting the rule.
53. 59 Mo. App. 401 (1894).
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than mere prior possession; that it became incumbent on the
plaintiff to show a right to the property as against the defendant.
Possession is mere prima facie evidence of title, the court said,
and when the defendant claimed title in himself, plaintiff's prima
facie case disappeared. Stated in another way, the rule is that
the plaintiff must win on the strength of his own case rather than
on the weakness of defendant's. It is apparent that in this case
the court became entangled in rules of presumption and begged
the very issue involved-that is, whether plaintiff's prior pos-
session would support replevin against the trespassing defen-
dant. The court, after admitting that plaintiff could prevail by
showing a right to the property as against the defendant, pro-
ceeded to hold that he had not done this by showing a peaceful
possession and a wrongful taking by the defendant, and then
gave as a reason for its decision that the defendant had claimed
title in himself!
There are other cases which on a cursory reading appear to
stand for the proposition that bare possession is not sufficient
to support an action in replevin. For instance, in Rosenstreter v.
Brady, 5 4 the court held that the bailee of a sheriff who had seized
property from the owner under a writ of attachment did not
have sufficient interest in the property to maintain replevin
against the former owner who had retaken the property, because
he (the plaintiff) ought to have had either a special or general
interest in the chattel, possession alone not being enough. This
case does not stand for the proposition that a wrongdoer who
interrupts the plaintiff's possession may defend successfully in
replevin. Here, there might have been some question as to the
validity of the attachment, and the court might have felt that the
owner should keep possession until the question could be deter-
mined in litigation with the sheriff. The bailee of the sheriff
was certainly not a proper party to litigate this question.
Jackson v. City of Columbia,5 is another case which is often
cited for the proposition that bare possession is not enough to
support an action of replevin. In this case, the city seized a car-
load of whiskey from Jackson, a bailee of the owner. In replevin
by Jackson against the city for return of the whiskey, the city
was allowed to defend by showing the title to the whiskey to be
54. 63 Mo. App. 398 (1895).
55. 217 S.W. 869 (Mo. 1920).
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in one Miller. Here again, the case cannot be cited for the propo-
sition under review. Jackson was in illegal possession of the
whiskey in the city of Columbia and the courts are not apt to
aid a person in violating the law. It is even doubtful whether
the true owner, Miller, could have recovered the property after
proof that it was contraband. This case could just as easily be
cited for the absurd proposition that the bailee of the true owner
may not prevail in replevin against one who seizes the property.
The problem is bound up with the "possession-gives-title"
doctrine and, while Missouri may not be overly eager to allow
replevin based on a prior, bare possession, when the question
narrows down to a contest between two mere possessors, one of
whom is a defendant-trespasser, Missouri will follow what is
supposed to be the converse of jus tertii. This converse rule is
that, as against a trespasser, possession is title. Stated in other
words, the rule is that a wrongdoer will not be permitted to
question the plaintiff's title which the plaintiff proves prima
facie by showing himself to have been in possession under a
claim of ownership. The classic example of this view is Anderson
v. Gouldberg.56 The view was adopted by Missouri in the case
of Campbell v. Brown.57 In this case, the plaintiff occupied a
newly formed island in the Mississippi River between Missouri
and Tennessee, cultivated it and built several buildings. The
island had not be included in any federal or state survey. The
plaintiff was selling sand from the island and had previously
made sales to the defendant. The defendant then tortiously re-
moved a barge-load of sand from the island, whereupon the
plaintiff sued in replevin for its return or value. The court com-
manded the defendant to return the sand or pay its value, and
based its decision on the plaintiff's prior, bare possession of the
island. The language of the court sounds so logical that it will
bear quoting:
A close examination of the cases pro and con regarding
naked possession will disclose that there is no real conflict,
but that what was said in each case was correct as applied
to the facts of that particular case. The correct rule to be
deduced from all the cases is that prior possession is suffi-
cient proof of title upon which to maintain the action of
replevin against a wrongdoer. That is, against one who may
56. 51 Minn. 294, 53 N.W. 638 (1892).
57. 146 Mo. App. 319 (1910), rehearing 160 Mo. App. 532 (1911).
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have dispossessed him or who may have tortiously inter-
ferred with his possessory right; but if the defendant has
come into possession of the property without having, in any
way, trespassed upon the plaintiff's right of possession, then
defendant's possession is as strong evidence of his title as
is plaintiff's prior possession, and as the burden of proof
is on the plaintiff, he must fail, but if defendant has tor-
tiously taken possession from the plaintiff he cannot profit by
his own wrong, and, in that case, will not be permitted to
assert a possession thus wrongfully acquired as a defense to
the plaintiff's claim. 8
It might be argued that the case is distinguishable because it
involved land, or that, since it was not surveyed, it belonged to
no one in whom the defendant might have set up the jus tertii.
The fact remains that the plaintiff was allowed to recover the
sand or its value on the strength of a mere prior possession.
Adverse possession of a chattel, as of land, will ripen into an
insdefeasible title and even sooner in most cases. The court made
no distinction on this basis. Nor would the court have been
impressed by any showing of ownership in some third party.
The language of the opinion is unequivocal.
In the case of 'Raini v. -Wyatt,5 the court held that one right-
fully in possession of an automobile, but without title because
of failure to obtain an assignment of the title certificate as re-
quired by statute, could maintain replevin against a trespasser
taking possession without right. The court, without citing the
Campbell case, reaffirmed the principle outlined in that decision,
stating that:
The fact that a third person may have some interest in the
property will not preclude replevin by one having the right
to possession as against the party sued. As the right of a
defendant to retain the property descends the scale of rela-
tive rights of possession to the vanishing point of a wrongful
detention by a trespasser, the interest sufficient to sustain
plaintiff's action in replevin diminishes.60
Even present Missouri statutes appear to state negatively that
a person who has neither the general or special interest in prop-
erty can maintain replevin. Early statutes provided that before
plaintiff could maintain replevin he had to be entitled to posses-
58. Id. at 323.
59. 335 Mo. 628, 73 S.W.2d 764 (1934). Accord, Pearl v. Interstate Secu-
rities Co., 357 Mo. 160, 206 S.W.2d 975 (1947).
60. 335 Mo. 628, 634, 73 S.W.2d 764 767 (1934).
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sion "by virtue of a special property therein."' This phrase was
subsequently omitted from the statutes and the present wording
states merely that he must be "lawfully entitled to possession. 6 2
There is, however, force in the argument that even as against
a trespasser, the plaintiff who claims nothing more than a bare
possession should not be awarded the value of the property in
the alternative. In such a case, the true owner might later take
the property from the defendant, or require him to pay for it
again. In most cases, even a trespasser has not committed such
a wrong as to justify requiring him to pay double the value of
the property. When, however, the defendant has disposed of the
property, he should be required to pay the plaintiff for it. But,
if the property is in possession of the defendant at the time of
the trial, an alternative judgment for money should not be
rendered.
Right of a defrauded Vendor to recover the Property if
Replevin.
The right of a vendor of personal property to sue in replevin
against a fraudulent vendee often arises. The general rule is
that a breach of contract cannot be litigated in a replevin suit,63
but an exception provides that a vendor may replevin goods from
a vendee who secured the transfer of the goods by fraud. The
exception rests on the theory that when a vendor is induced by
fraud to part with the possession of his goods, the property
never passes and the vendor may therefore recover possession
from the vendee ." The vendor may also maintain replevin
against the execution creditor of the fraudulent vendee,65 or a
purchaser or mortgagee with notice of the fraud,6 or a sheriff
who has seized on execution for creditors,67 or a taker from the
vendee in payment of an antecedent debt.6 8 But once the goods
pass into the hands of an innocent purchaser for present value,
the purchaser acquires an indefeasible title and the vendor may
not recover the goods in replevin.69
61. Mo. LAWS 1849, art. 8, § 1.
62. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1788 (1939).
63. International Fire Door Equipment Co. v. St. Louis Fire Door Co.,
13 S.W.2d 582 (Mo. 1929).
64. Dry Goods Company v. Jacobs, 66 Mo. App. 362 (1896).
65. Stein, Block & Co. v. Hill, 100 Mo. App. 38, 71 S.W. 1107 (1903).
66. Spitz, Londauer & Co. v. Kerfoot, 42 Mo. App. 77 (1890).
67. Goebel v. Troll, 71 Mo. App. 123 (1897).
68. Dry Goods Co. v. Jacobs, 66 Mo. App. 362 (1896).
69. Bidault v. Wales & Son, 20 Mo. 547 (1855).
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No trouble is met in applying the rules once the fraud has
been established, but it is often far from easy to establish the
fraud. The task is relatively simple in those cases when the
vendor parts with his property for some worthless return, such
as a bad check, counterfeit money, and the like. It will be re-
membered that there must be some misrepresentation of a ma-
terial fact on the part of the vendee, together with certain other
elements, before fraud can be established. Accordingly, when the
sale is made in reliance upon representations by the vendee that
he is solvent, the sale is avoided on the vendor's showing that
the vendee was, in fact, insolvent, if the other elements of fraud
are present.70 The representation of solvency must come from
the vendee himself. Accordingly, it has been held that a Dun-
Bradstreet commercial agency report which falsely represented
the vendee to be better off than he was, which the vendee knew
to be false and which the vendor relied on, was not enough if
the vendee did not contribute to the false report.71
Mere insolvency of the vendee alone at the time of the sale
is not fraud, in the absence of some misrepresentation of that
fact, and this is true even if the buyer knew at the time of the
sale that he was insolvent, but did not tell the vendor.72 The
vendor on finding that he has sold his property on credit to a
person in dire financial straits is often only too eager to charge
that a fraud has been perpetrated against him. But the insol-
vency of the vendee can be so hopeless that silence on his part
may be tantamount to the misrepresentation of a material fact.
When the vendee purchases goods and accepts the possession
thereof, there is either an express or implied promise to pay for
them. Hence, by implication, the vendee states that he intends
to pay for the goods. Therefore, if it can be shown that he really
never had any intention of paying, a material fact has been
misrepresented and the sale may be avoided and the goods re-
covered in replevin. Accordingly, it has been held that when
the insolvency is so hopeless as to afford no other inference than
that the vendee could not have intended to pay for the goods, it
is tantamount to an intention never to pay. '3 The rule in-
'70. Moore & Bier v. Hinsdale, 77 Mo. App. 217 (1898) ; Beebe v. Hatfield,
67 Mo. App. 609 (1896).
71. Stein, Block & Co. v. Hill, 100 Mo. App. 38, 71 S.W. 1107 (1903).
72. Bidault v. Wales, 19 Mo. 36 (1853); Fox v. Webster, 46 Mo. 181(1870).
73. Manufacturing Company v. Troll, 77 Mo. App. 339 (1898).
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volves the delicate problem of attributing to a person a certain
state of mind and the courts have proceeded cautiously in apply-
ing it. It is recognized that an insolvent vendee may have a bona
fide intent to pay for the goods at the time the sale is made, and
it is therefore not sufficient to show that at the time of the sale
the vendee had no reasonable expectation of doing so.7 ' It ap-
pears that before the rule can be applied, the extrinsic facts
must show that the vendee could have had no expectation of
paying for the goods at all.
Replevin based on an executory Contract of Sale.
It is interesting to note that, even though many common law
jurisdictions allowed detinue against the vendor of an executory
contract to sell a specific chattel,' there is some doubt whether
this can be done under Missouri's "claim and delivery" statutes
which have supposedly incorporated the substantive law of
detinue. In Boutel v. Warne,7 6 the court said that when there is
only an agreement to sell and the sale is not executed on the
buyer's side an action for possession cannot be maintained. The
court went on to say that the proper remedy in such cases would
be an action for damages for breach of contract. The same rule
was restated as late as 1948.77 In that case, a wife brought re-
plevin based on a written agrement between herself and her hus-
band whereby she was to have crtain property when they were
divorced. The court, citing the Boutell case as authority, ruled
that before the right of possession would accrue, the wife must
show that she had performed all her obligations under the
agreement regardless of whether or not such obligations were
conditions precedent. In other words, the court held that before
replevin can be based on a contract, such contract must be fully
executed on the part of one who would enforce it in a replevin
action. In both of the above cases, however, there are facts
which would justify the courts withholding possession from
the vendee. But the language of the cases is broad enough to
preclude replevin based on any executory contract of sale, Such
a rule seems hardly justifiable under the present statutes which
require merely that the plaintiff be "lawfully entitled to pos-
74. Manheiner v. Harrington, 20 Mo. App. 297 (1886).
75. See note 5 supra.
76. 62 Mo. 350 (1876).
77. Mohr v. Prinster, 213 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. App. 1948).
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session." In this connection it might be noted that Missouri has
not adopted the Uniform Sales Act under which the property in
specified goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made,
so that he can then recover possession in replevin or detinue7
8
FIXING THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY AND DAMAGES FOR
ITS DETENTION
General.
The statute says that the prevailing party 7 in replevin shall
have a return of the property or be paid the value assessed
at the election of the successful party, together with the damages
sustained for the taking and detention, or the detention alone
when the original taking was rightful. 0 This requirement of
the statute has caused the courts much trouble and, though in
the main the cases have arrived at a just result, the methods
used have often been rather haphazard. Any attempt at making
a pattern of the court holdings regarding specific problems is
difficult, from whatever angle the approach be made, and this
is especially true of the damages problem. A better understand-
ing will result if the reader bears in mind throughout the dis-
cussion which is to follow that, when the statute says that the
value and damages shall be assessed, it aims at compensation
of a party whose property has been taken from him and detained
by another. Punitive damages rarely enter into consideration
in replevin actions. Indeed, no Missouri cases were found in
which such damages were awarded, although the courts would
not hesitate to award this type of damages where the conduct of
the party is regarded as malicious."'
The first problem is whether the losing party in the replevin
suit is ever excused from accounting for the value of the prop-
erty. A minority of the jurisdictions in the United States hold
that an act of God which destroys the property will excuse the
78. Section 19 (1) of the Uniform Sales Act provides that "where there
is an unconditional contract to sell specific goods, in a deliverable state, the
property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made and
it is immaterial whether the time of payment, or the time of delivery, or
both, be postponed."
79. It should be noted that the "prevailing party" may be either the
plaintiff or defendant and that he may or may not have possession of the
properny at the time of the trial, the other party having recovered or re-
tained possession under the statutory bond privilege.
80. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 1799, 1801 (1939).
81. Laughlin v. Barnes, 76 Mo. App. 258 (1898).
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losing party. Missouri has adopted this view, but with some
curious exceptions. In Pope v. Jenkins,82 for example, the de-
fendant had retained possession of slaves pending a replevin
suit for their possession by plaintiff. Through no fault of the
defendant, the slaves died before the litigation was completed.
The court held that the defendant was excused from paying their
value. A similar view was adopted in Jennings v. Sparkma 8S3
involving live stock. But in Bradley v. Campbell4 the property
involved was furniture and, while in possession of the defendant
under a delivery bond, the furniture was destroyed by fire
through no fault of the defendant. The court ruled that the
defendant must nevertheless account for the value of the prop-
erty. The reason assigned by the court was that the defendant,
in refusing to reutrn the property and contesting the replevin
suit, was asserting ownership therein. Therefore, when he
failed in his claim by losing the replevin suit, his possession was
revealed as wrongful from the first. Whether the losing party
should be held absolutely liable for the value of the property
should not turn on any such subtle distinction; nor should the
question turn on whether the property involved be animals as
distinguished from ordinary personal property. The character
of the possession alone should be considered. If the losing party
in the suit be the defendant, he could be a wrongful taker, a
defaulting mortgagor, a lien holder, a pledgee, or the like. The
plaintiff's possession, on the other hand, will always be under
a redelivery bond by which he asserts a right to the possession of
the property. When the defendant is in possession of the prop-
erty by virtue of a wrongful taking, there should be no difficulty
in holding him absolutely liable for the value of the property.
Conversely, in absence of an agreement to the contrary, there
seems to be no reason why a defaulting mortgagor, a lien holder,
a pledgee or the like, whose possession was originally rightful,
should be held accountable for the value of the property in case
of its destruction by an act of God. Whether or not the plaintiff
should be held absolutely liable for the value of the property
when he loses in the replevin suit ought to depend on the bona
fides of his claim under the redelivery bond. Or, since he has
82. 30 Mo. 528 (1843).
83. 48 Mo. App. 246 (1892).
84. 132 Mo. App. 78, 111 S.W. 514 (1908).
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asserted a claim of ownership or right to possession of the prop-
erty by seizure under the bond, it might be held that his posses-
sion becomes wrongful when judgment goes for the defendant.
If this view is correct, he should then be absolutely liable for
the value of the property in the event of its destruction by an
act of God.
Except for those few instances when the courts relieve the
losing party from liability for the property, the losing party in
the replevin suit must account for the property or its value at
the election of the prevailing party. This "election" given to
the winning party thus makes it necessary to fix the value of the
property in every replevin suit. The alternative judgment for
the return of the property or its value serves two purposes:
(1) even if the property be in possession of one of the litigants
at the time of the trial, the prevailing party may elect whether
he will take the value rather than the property itself; (2) if the
party who had the possession has disposed of the property, or
if it has been destroyed pending suit, the prevailing party may
collect the value. The question is what point of time will be used
to fix the value of the property for purposes of the alternative
judgment-the time of the taking, the time of the trial, or some
intermediate point? It is necessary to consider these possibilities
because the time at which the value of the property is fixed
necessarily controls the measure of damages for the taking and
detention of the property. In this connection, it should be borne
in mind that "value" as used in the statute, and the damages for
the "taking and detention" are two distinct concepts and must
be determined separately, even though they are so interrelated
that the "value" must control the measure of damages for the
taking and detention.85 This "value" then, plus the damages for
the "taking and detention," contemplates full compensation for
the wronged party as of the exact moment he parted with the
possession of his property.
It will be remembered that in trover the procedure for com-
pensating the plaintiff is relatively simple. The value of the
85. As long ago as 1883 the court in Chapman v. Kerr 80 Mo. 158 (1883),
warned against confounding the value of the property to be found and the
damages to be assessed, insisting that they must necessarily be determined
separately. See also Young v. Griesbauer, 183 S.W.2d 917 (Mo. App. 1944),
where the court said that the value of the property is not a part of statutory
"damages."
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property is fixed at a specific time and this value alone wholly
compensates the plaintiff for his loss, legal interest on the value
being the only damages necessary. The value in trover is nor-
mally fixed as of the time of taking. This eliminates the need
to calculate damages for injury or deterioration because these
items become immaterial when the plaintiff gets back the exact
value of the property as of the moment he parted with it. In
case of appreciation in value happening subsequent to the taking,
however, merely to fix the value as of the time of taking might
not fully compensate the wronged party. In such cases, some
intermediate point is used-often that point where the property
reached it highest value between the time of taking and the
time of trial. But here again, only one calculation is made and
with this the prevailing party is fully compensated, no items of
damages except legal interest being necessary. Damages for the
value of the use are not proper in trover because the theory of
action is that the losing party by his conversion, has "bought
something" and his "purchase" relates back to the time of the
taking. Under this theory he was the owner of the property
from the time he took it, might use it as he saw fit, and is there-
fore entitled to the use value of the property.86
Fixing Value and Damages when the losing Party still has
Possession of the Property at Time of the Trial.
In addition to the fact that use damages are awarded in re-
plevin, there is another reason why the problem of compensating
the wronged party is more complicated in replevin than in
trover. In Missouri, when one of the litigants still has possession
of the property at the time of the trial, the prevailing party is
given a choice of a return of the property or its value ;87 hence,
it is necessary to fix the value of the property as of the time of
the trial. Because the property is to be returned, if at all, at the
time of the trial, an equality of the property and "value" as
spoken of in the statutes is contemplated. In other words, since
86. In Missouri, the rule which allows damages for loss or use in replevin
and not in trover, can work to the disadvantage of the plaintiff. When the
defendant has disposed of the property before plaintiff can commence the
replevin suit, plaintiff's only recourse is trover (see not 29, supra); hence,
no use damages. This may be one reason why some jurisdictions (New
Jersey, for instance, note 30 supra) allow replevin even when the defendant
has disposed of the property before suit is commenced. In such jurisdic-
tions the plaintiff always has an election between trover and replevin.
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the property is to be returned at the time of the trial, it follows
that the value must be fixed as of that time also.88 Another
reason for the rule may be owing to the fact that it is much
easier for a jury to assess the value of property which it has
before it. At any rate, Missouri's cases are uniform in holding
that when one of the litigants still has possession of the property
at the time of the trial, the value must be fixed as of that time.""
It is obvious that in many cases the property may have a differ-
ent value at the time of the trial than it had when taken from
the prevailing party. The property may have either increased
or decreased in value. If the value has increased so that it is
higher at the time of the trial than at the time of taking, the
prevailing party is not over-compensated because the court has
decided that the property belonged to him and the owner of
property naturally takes any increase in value. However, prop-
erty involved in replevin actions is more likely to decrease in
value between the time of taking and time of trial. The prevail-
ing party must therefore be compensated for this deficiency in
the form of various items of damages, and this is true whether
he elects the property or its value. What are these elements of
damages which must be added to the value of the property as
found at the time of the trial? The nature of such damages will
vary according to whether the property involved has or has not
a use value to the owner.
Personal property having no use value will normally have
decreased in value to some extent between the time it was taken
from the owner and the time of the trial. For instance, when
the property has been injured by the losing party, the amount of
this damage must be calculated and awarded the prevailing
party so as fully to compensate him for his loss.00 It appears
that if the property has decreased in value for any reason, even
due to natural attrition, the amount of such deterioration must
be calculated and awarded the prevailing party.91 Some cases
87. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 1799, 1801 (1939).
88. Willison v. Smith, 60 Mo. App. 469 (1891).
89. Pope v. Jenkins, 30 Mo. 528 (1843) ; Mix v. Kepner, 81 Mo. 93 (1883);
Ascher v. Schaefer, 25 Mo. App. 3 (1886); Baldridge v. Dawson, 39 Mo.
App. 527 (1890); Hinchey v. Koch, 42 Mo. App. 230 (1890); Payne v. King,
141 Mo. App. 246 (1910); Muzenich v. McLam, 220 Mo. App. 502 (1925).
90. Kreiboln v. Yancey, 154 Mo. 67 (1899).
91. Mix v. Kepner, 81 Mo. 93 (1883) ; Baldridge v. Dawson, 30 Mo. App.
527 (1890); Hinchey v. Koch, 42 Mo. App. 230 (1890); Jennings v. Spark-
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have held that the deterioration must have been caused by the
intentional injury or negligence of the losing party before he is
liable.2 The property may be worth less at the time of the trial
because of a fall in market value. If so, the losing party must
pay the difference. 3 For some peculiar reason, no interest is
awarded in any case where the value of the property is fixed as
of the time of trial. The possible reasons for this rule are dis-
cussed below.94 Where no damages at all are shown, the prevail-
ing party is entitled at least to norminal damages.93 The courts
are generally agreed that items such as counsel fees and expenses
in prosecution of the suit are not proper elements of damages
in replevin actions.96
When the property involved has a use value to the owner,
different considerations with respect to damages arise. Missouri
follows the universal rule that the value of the use of property
taken and detained is a proper element of damages in replevin.97
Before such damages can be awarded, the property must be such
as is primarily valuable for its use, such as a sawmill,9s a truck, 9
laundry equipment, 00 mules,:10 or slaves,0 2 as distinguished from
ordinary articles of property which are possessed primarily for
purposes of consumption or sale.1"3 When the prevailing party
could not lawfully have used the property even though entitled
to possession, damages for the value of the use cannot be
man, 48 Mo. App. 246 (1891); Trinkle v. Mercantile Co., 56 Mo. App. 633
(1894) ; Kreiboln v. Yancey, 154 Mo. 67, 55 S.W. 260 (1899) ; Muzenich v.
McLain, 20 Mo. App. 502, 274 S.W. 888 (1925).
92. Chemical Company v. Nickells, 66 Mo. App. 678 (1896).
93. Rosenblatt v. Winstanley, 186 S.W. 542 (Mo. 1916) (fall in market
value due to change in style during the detention).
94. See note 116 infra.
95. American Alliance Insurance Co. v. Mead, 242 S.W. 1005 (Mo. 1922).
96. Mix v. Kepner, 81 Mo. 93 (1883); Trinkle v. Mercantile Co., 56 Mo.
App. 683 (1894); Wright v. Broome, 67 Mo. App. 32 (1896); Howard v.
Haas, 139 Mo. App. 591, 123 S.W. 1048 (1909); Hodkinson v. McNeal
Machine Co., 161 Mo. App. 87, 142 S.W. 457 (1911).
97. Shenuit v. Brueggestradt, 8 Mo. App. 46 (1879) ; Anchor Milling Co.
v. Walsh, 24 Mo. App. 97 (1887); Jennings v. Sparkman, 48 Mo. App. 246
(1891); Reno v. Kingsbury, 39 Mo. App. 240 (1889); Trinkle v. Mercantile
Co., 56 Mo. App. 683 (1894) ; Baldridge v. Dawson, 39 Mo. App. 527 (1890) ;
Laughlin v. Barnes, 76 Mo. App. 258 (1898); Kreiboln v. Yancey, 154 Mo.
67, 55 S.W. 260 (1899) ; Robertson v. Snider, 86 S.W.2d 966 (Mo. 1935).
98. Stockham v. Leach, 210 Mo. App. 407, 238 S.W. 853 (1922).
99. Robertson v. Snider, 86 S.W.2d 966 (Mo. 1935).
100. Kreiboln v. Yancey, 154 Mo. 67, 55 S.W. 260 (1899).
101. Jennings v. Sparkman, 48 Mo. App. 246 (1891).
102. Pope v. Jenkins, 30 Mo. 528 (1843).
103. Chemical Co. v. Nickells, 66 Mo. App. 678 (1896);- Shenuit v.
Brueggestradt, 8 Mo. App. 46 (1879).
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awarded. 04 When damages for the value of the use are awarded,
any deterioration brought about by use of the property by the
losing party are not awarded the prevailing party.1°5 This rule
is just because the party who gets the value of the use should
stand the deterioration loss caused by such use. For the same
reason the court will deduct from the value of the use any main-
tenance costs which were borne by the losing party.101 Further-
more, because interest itself is a sort of use premium, interest is
not a proper element of damages in any case where the prevailing
party is awarded damages for the loss of use of his property.107
For any other type of value decrease, however, such as that
caused by injury to the property, fall in market value or deterior-
ation from causes other than use, the prevailing party is awarded
damages just as for property having no use value. The aim is
always to compensate the wronged party and this in accom-
plished by fixing the value as of the time of the trial and adding
thereto any elements of damages to which the prevailing party
is entitled, including damages for the loss of use. It should be
noted that when the value of the property is fixed as of the time
of trial, and when the losing party used the property, any dete-
rioration brought about by such use is thus automatically cal-
culated by this fixing of value as of the time of trial. When the
losing party did not actually use the property though he pos-
sessed same, this deterioration would not be reflected at time of
the trial. The court would then have to guess at the amount the
chattel would have depreciated had it been used and subtract this
amount from any use damages awarded to the prevailing party.
Value and Damages when the Losing Party has disposed of
Property prior to the Trial.
It often happens that the party having possession of the prop-
erty will dispose of it between the time suit was commenced and
the trial. The prevailing party out of possession is then deprived
of his right of election between the property or its value and
must be satisfied with the value. At the same time, the fact that
the winner may not elect between the property or its value at
the time of the trial eliminates the requirement discussed above
104. Robertson v. Snider, 86 S.W. 966 (Mo. 1935).
105. Kreiboln v. Yancey, 154 Mo. 67, 55 S.W. 260 (1899).
106. Ibid.
107. Reno v. Kingsbury, 39 Mo. App. 240 (1889).
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that the value of the property must be fixed as of the time of
the trial. Having in mind the relatively more simple method of
compensating the plaintiff in trover-the method whereby the
value is fixed at such a time so as to effect full compensation,
thus eliminating elements of damages-the Missouri courts have
ruled that in those cases where the losing party has disposed of
the property pending trial, the value of the property is to be
fixed as of the time of taking, or the refusal to return when the
original taking was rightful.08 It is obvious that for personal
property having no use value the courts are greatly simplifying
the calculations necessary to compensate the wronged party in
reverting to the time-of-taking rule when the losing party has
disposed of the property prior to the trial. When the value of
the property is fixed as of the time of taking and there has been
a decrease in value, items of damages such as that caused by
injury to the property, fall in market value, or other deteriora-
tion, become immaterial. 1' 9 When there has been a rise in market
value of property disposed of prior to the trial, merely to fix
the value as of the time of taking would not fully compensate the
prevailing party. In case the market value of the property is
higher at the time of trial than at the time of taking, the courts
usually abandon the time-of-taking rule and fix the value as of
the time of trial so that the prevailing party would not lose the
substantial rise in market value."10 Further, even though the
property does not reflect an increase in value at the time of the
trial, there might be other instances when the wronged party
might not be fully compensated merely by fixing the value as of
the time of taking. Such instances often occur in the case of
property which fluctuates in value so that it reaches its highest
value at some point between the taking and the trial. In such
cases, it may become necessary to peg the value at some inter-
mediate points in order fully to compensate the wronged party.
Problems dealing with property which fluctuates in value are
discussed below.
108. Willison v. Smith, 60 Mo. App. 469 (1891) ; Chemical Co. v. Nickells,
66 Mo. App. 678 (1896); Jones v. Jones, 188 Mo. App. 220, 175 S.W. 227(1915).
109. Of course, when the original acquisition of the property by the losing
party was rightful and his possession became wrongful only by his refusal
to return at the proper time, any injury occurring prior to the refusal
should be awarded the prevailing party.
110. Schnabel v. Thomas, 98 Mo. App. 197 (1903).
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In those cases when the value of the property having no use
value is fixed as of the time of taking because the losing party
has disposed of it at the time of the trial, interest is a proper
measure of damages. The full measure of compensation is then
the value of the property at the time of taking plus the legal
rate of interest on the value from the time of taking to the trial.",
It will be remembered that when the value is fixed as of the
time of the trial, the courts refuse to award interest as damages
in replevin. The possible reasons for awarding interest in the
former case and refusing it in the latter are discussed below.
We have seen that when the losing party disposes of property
having no use value prior to the trial, the calculation of sundry
items of damages becomes unnecessary because the value is fixed
at the time of the taking, thus simplifying the replevin procedure
greatly. Would this same simplification apply if the property
involved has a use value to the owner? Unfortunately, no. This
is true because regardless of the time at which the value of the
property is fixed deterioration brought about by use must be
calculated in order to prevent the prevailing party from getting
the use value without paying for the deterioration caused by
use. When the value is fixed as of the time of the trial, this
deterioration is automatically reflected in the value at that time.
When, however, the value must be fixed as of the time of taking,
and the prevailing party is to be awarded use value, deteriora-
tion caused by use must be subtracted from the amount awarded
as use damages.112 Thus, it appears that the only situation in
which the "time-of-taking" procedure could profitably be used
in Missouri to fix the value of the property would be for chattels
having no use value and which have been disposed of prior to
the trial by the losing litigant.
Interest as Damages in Replevin.
When the property in replevin has a use value, the prevailing
party is compensated for loss of use directly and, of course, may
not have interest on the value of the property.1 3 To award inter-
est in such cases would, in effect, cause double use damages. By
111. Chemical Co. v. Nickells, 66 Mo. App. 678 (1896).
112. For an example of how complicated the procedure becomes when
the value of property having a use value is fixed as of the time of taking,
see Kreiboln v. Yancey, 154 Mo. 67, 55 S.W. 260 (1899).
113. Reno v. Kingsbury, 39 Mo. App. 240 (1889).
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the same reasoning it would appear logical to award interest in
any case where the property does not have a use value. This
is not the case in Missouri. Missouri allows interest on the
value from time of taking to them of trial if, and only if,
the losing party has disposed of the property having no use
value pending the litigation so that the value is fixed as of the
time of taking.114 In Chemical Co. v. Nickells,1" for example,
the court held that where defendants were deprived of their
statutory right of election in consequence of the disposal by
plaintiff of property having no use value, the damages would
be the value of the property at the time of the taking with six
per cent interest from that time until the time of trial.
When, however, the value of property having no use value must
be fixed as of the time of trial because the losing litigant is still
in possession, it has been held that interest is not a proper ele-
ment of damages.,- 6 It is suggested that the latter rule is based
on a misconstruction of an early supreme court case. Early cases
had been ruling that the value of property in replevin suits
should be fixed as of the time of taking regardless of whether
the losing party still had possession at time of trial. In Wood.
burn v. Cogdall," the court said that
the true measure of damages in such cases is the value of
the property at the time of the seizure with interest at the
rate of six per cent per annum until the time of trial." 8
A similar ruling was made in Miller v. Whitson:"x9
It is well established by decisions of this court that the
measure of damages in such cases when the finding is for the
defendant is the value of the property when taken with legal
interest thereon to time of the trial.120
It will be noted that the holding in both cited cases includes two
propositions: (1) that the time at which the value of the prop-
erty is to be fixed in replevin actions is the time of taking and
114. Woodburn v. Cogdal, 39 Mo. App. 222 (1866); Miller v. Whitson,
40 Mo. 97 (1867); Chemical Co. v. Nickells, 66 Mo. App. 678 (1896);
Cummings v. Lumber Co., 130 Mo. App. 557, 109 S.W. 68 (1908); Zahner
Mfg. Co. v. Harnish, 227 Mo. App. 287, 51 S.W.2d 145 (1932).
115. 66 Mo. App. 678 (1896).
116. Andrews v. Costigan, 30 Mo. App. 29 (1888). And see 96 A.L.R. 142,
where Missouri is listed among those jurisdictions which generally do not
consider interest a proper element of damages in replevin.
117. 39 Mo. 222 (1866).
118. Id. at 229.
119. 40 Mo. 97 (1867).
120. Id. at 101.
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(2) that interest in such cases is a proper measure of damages.
Later in the case of Chapman v. Kerr=' the supreme court had
before it a case in which the lower courts had agreed with the
Whitson and Cogdal cases as to proposition number one-that
the value of property in replevin actions is to be fixed as of the
time of taking regardless of whether the losing party has pos-
session at time of trial. The supreme court saying nothing what-
ever regarding proposition number two-that interest is a proper
measure of damages in replevin actions-reversed the lower
courts and overruled both the Whitson and Cogdal cases in their
holding that the value of property still in possession of the losing
party at the time of the trial should be fixed as of the time of
taking, citing a much earlier supreme court decision as author-
ity."' Five years later the case of Andrews v. Costigan.," 2 involv-
ing logs which the plaintiff had taken from the defendant under
a redelivery bond, came before a Missouri appellate court. Judg-
ment was entered for the defendant and he elected to take the
money value instead of the logs. Value of the logs was fixed
as of the time of the trial in accordance with the ruling in the
Chapman case that for property in possession of the losing party
at the time of the trial the value should be fixed as of that time.
The defendant further claimed that he should have interest on
the money value of the logs. The court held that "interest was
not warranted" and cited as authority the Chapmn case, which,
the court said, oierruled the holding of the Cogdal case that the
"true measure of damages in such cases is the value of the prop-
erty at the time of the seizure with interest at the rate of six
per cent per annum until the time of the trial." In other words,
the Costigan case construed the Chapman case as overruling the
Cogdal and Whitson cases as to both propositions: that the time
of fixing the value is the time of taking and (2) that interest
is a proper measure of damages when actually, as seen above,
the Chapman case said nothing whatever regarding the propriety
of awarding interest as damages in those cases where the value
is fixed as of the time of the trial.
Since the Costigan case the courts have been noticeably silent
regarding interest as a measure of damages in those cases where
121. 80 Mo. 158 (1883).
122. Pope v. Jenkins, 30 Mo. 528 (1843).
123. 30 Mo. App. 29 (1888).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss4/4
NOTES
the value of the property is fixed as of the time of the trial. If
the failure of the courts to allow interest in such cases is not
based on a misconstruction of Chapman v. Kerr, as suggested,
is there any valid reason why interest should not be given?
It is sometimes said that interest is not allowable as damages in
absence of a statute,24 or that interest is not allowed in tort
actions prior to judgment.2 5 The following statute would seem
to nullify both of these rules:
The jury on the trial of any issue [in tort actions] or on any
inquisition of damages, may, if they shall think fit, give
damages in the nature of interest, over and above the value
of the goods at the time of the conversion or seizure.1 26
Thus there seems to be nothing legally wrong in awarding inter-
est in any case where use value is not given. Although the courts
have not expressed any reason for not giving interest in such
cases (thus strengthening the misconstruction theory suggested
above), a possible explpanation might be something like the
following: the fact that the value is to be fixed as of the time of
trial means that the losing party still has possession at that time
so that, under the statutes, the prevailing party may elect
whether he will take the property or its value. Since he may
elect the return of the property itself, interest is not warranted
because interest is not ordinarily payable on the use of property,
a fee for hire or rental being more appropriate. But by hypothe-
sis the property had no use value and if it did it is unquestioned
that interest would not be warranted. Besides, such reasoning
would at most justify refusal of interest only in those cases
where the prevailing party elected the property rather than the
value and, as noted above, Andrews v. Costigan refused to allow
interest even when the prevailing party had elected the money
value of the property. There appears to be no justification for
the rule. Even in those instances when the prevailing party
elects to take the property, interest might justly be awarded on
the theory that the owner might have chosen to sell the property
but for its detention by the losing party. In this way he would
have money on which he could have earned interest. The only
reasonable basis on which to decide whether or not to award in-
124. Simmons Hdwe. Co. v. St. Louis, 192 S.W. 394 (Mo. 1917).
125. Stack v. St. Louis I. M. and S. Ry. Co., 187 S.W. 275 (Mo. App.
1916).
126. Mo. RPv. STAT. ANN. § 3657 (1939).
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terest in replevin actions is whether or not the property involved
has a use value. If it does, the Missouri courts rightly refuse
interest. The fact that in certain cases the value of property
having no use value must be fixed as of the time of trial should
have no bearing at all on whether or not to award interest. The
courts allow interest as damages when the value is fixed as of
the time of taking. It is apparently an arbitrary rule which
refuses interest when the value is to be fixed as of the time of
trial, even though identical property be involved.
PROPERTY WHICH FLUCTUATES IN VALUE
We have seen that when there has been a straight rise or fall
in the value of property between the time of taking and the time
of trial, Missouri's rules fixing the value at either the time of
taking or time of trial are flexible enough to prevent the losing
party's juggling to the detriment of the prevailing party. For
instance, when the losing party is still in possession at time of
trial so that the value must be fixed as of that time and there
has been a fall in market value from the time of taking to the
time of trial, the losing party must pay damages for the fall
in market value.127 Thus, the losing party, by holding onto prop-
erty which is falling in value cannot profit by the rule that the
value of property still in his possession at the time of the trial
must be fixed as of that time. Conversely, we have seen that
when the losing party disposes of property which rises in value
from time of taking to time of trial he cannot profit under the
rule which would normally fix the value of property disposed of
prior to suit as of the time of taking, because, in such cases, the
courts will not adhere to the time-of-taking rule, but will fix the
value as of the time of trial so that the increased value is re-
flected. 128
Suppose that the property involved is of a nature which fluc-
tuates in value so that at some point between the time of taking
and the time of trial it reached its highest value. It is obvious
that, in such cases, to fix the value at either the time of taking
or time of trial would not compensate the prevailing party for
what he might have realized from his property except for the
detention by the losing party. Would the Missouri courts com-
127. Rosenblatt v. Winstanley, 186 S.W. 542 (Mo. 1916).
128. Schnabel v. Thomas, 98 Mo. App. 197, 71 S.W. 1076 (1903).
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pensate the prevailing party for this increased value either by
fixing the value of property which has been disposed of prior to
the trial as of some intermediate point between time of taking
and time of trial, or, in those cases where the value must be
fixed as of the time of trial, by awarding damages based on the
higher intervening value? No Missouri replevin actions involv-
ing property of this nature were found, hence it is not known
just what procedure the courts would use. In trover it appears
that the courts ignore any fluctuations in value and adhere
strictly to the time-of-taking rule in fixing the value of the
property.129 Traditionally, however, the courts are more liberal
in awarding damages in replevin than in trover and we have
seen that Missouri will so arrange its replevin rules so as fully
to compensate the prevailing party where there has been a
straight rise or fall in the market value of property. The courts
might, therefore, take into consideration a fluctuation in value
between the time of taking and the time of trial in replevin
actions. How could they best do this?
When property which fluctuates in value is involved in trover
actions, the jurisdictions of the United States use three different
times at which to fix the value of the property. Some jurisdic-
tions (including Missouri) fix the value as of the time of taking,
ignoring the fluctuation. Others give the plaintiff the highest
value reached by the property between the time of taking and the
time of trial. This procedure is often unjust because it permits
the plaintiff to relax and play the market without fear of losing
anything. A compromise was reached between the two foregoing
rules by the New York courts which ruled that the plaintiff
should have the highest value reached by the property between
the time he knew of the conversion and a reasonable time there-
after, during a period that he could have replaced the property
on the open market. This rule is based on the theory that it is
always plaintiff's duty to mitigate the defendant's damages
where possible.210 Working within the above rules and the frame-
work of Missouri law regarding the time at which the value is
to be fixed in replevin actions, consider the possibilities when
there has been a fluctuation in value.
129. Darling v. Potts, 118 Mo. 506, 24 S.W. 461 (1893); Walker v.
Boland, 21 Mo. 289 (1855); Ross v. Fidelity Bank and Trust Co., 115
S.W.2d 148 (Mo. App. 1938).
130. For a discussion of relative merits of the three rules and jurisdic-
tions using each, see McCoRMIcK, DAmAGES § 48 (1935).
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Where losing Party has Possession at Time of Trial.
The type of property under review is most likely to be goods
held for the purpose of consumption or sale, for which reason it
'is highly unlikely that the losing party would still have posses-
sion at the time of the trial. Assuming that he did, however, the
value must be fixed as of that time.31 In such a case the prevail-
ing party would get the property or its value at the time of trial
plus damages representing the difference between the value as
found at the time of trial and either the highest value reached
between the taking and the trial, or the highest value reached
after the prevailing party learned of the conversion and a reason-
able time thereafter, depending on whether or not the New York
rule discussed above were used. For obvious reasons, other types
of damages such as for deterioration, injury, or fall in market
value, could not be awarded. Except for Missouri's refusal to
award interest anytime the value is fixed as of the time of trial,
interest could be awarded on the value of the property-but per-
haps not on the damages since such damages are really based
on a loss of profits and it has been held that when this is true
interest cannot be given 31 2
As noted, property which fluctuates in value is most likely to
be the type held for consumption or sale, and not for use, hence
damages for loss of use would rarely enter into consideration in
the type of case under review. Theoretically the property could
have a use value, in which case the prevailing party would be
awarded damages for the loss of use. However, since damages
awarded for the difference in value as of the time of trial and at
some intervening point between the taking and the trial are
based on a presumed sale of the property at that point but for
the detention by the other party, damages for the loss of use
should be given only from the time of taking up to the time of
the presumed sale. When the prevailing party receives use dam-
ages of course, interest is not warranted.
Where the Losing Party has Disposed of the Property prior to
Trial
When the losing party has disposed of property prior to the
time of trial, the Missouri courts fix the value as of the time of
131. See note 89 supra.
132. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 128 Mo. 224, 27 S.W.
568 (1895).
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taking.113 Hence, if the Missouri courts wanted to compensate
the winner for an increased intervening value owing to fluctua-
tion in value, the time at which to fix the value of the property
could be moved up to one of the intervening points already dis-
cussed. Interest could be awarded on the value of the property
as of the time of taking though perhaps not on the higher inter-
vening value for the reason mentioned above.13 If the property
had a use value, which is unlikely, he could be awarded damages
for loss of use from the time of taking up to the time of the pre-
sumed sale, deducting both deterioration caused by the use and
any maintenance cost borne by the losing party.
DIVIDED OWNERSHIP IN THE PROPERTY
Where it is found in a replevin suit that both parties have an
interest in the property-one having the general property and
the other a special property-wholly different considerations
arise than those heretofore discussed. For instance, suppose
that the plaintiff in a replevin suit is found to own the property,
but it turns out that the defendant has a possessory lien. Re-
plevin being a possessory action, it is obvious that the defendant
will prevail in the suit as far as the possession of the property
is concerned. Suppose in such a case that the defendant has re-
tained the possession of the property either because the plaintiff
did not file the required redelivery bond, or because the defen-
dant has filed a delivery bond. The defendant will be adjudged
to keep possession of the property. Should the court go further?
OneMissouri court had just such a case before it in which it was
held that where the defendant still has possession and it turns out
that he has a lien on the property, the disputed amount of the lien
may be determined by the jury and judgment rendered for the
return of the property to the plaintiff on his paying the lien.135
The court said that it would retain the case and adjust all the
equities of the parties in the property. Such procedure appears
all right since the disputed lien amount would probably have to
be determined by court action anyway, and the finding of the
amount of the lien as incidental to the replevin action ipso facto
found that the plaintiff could not regain possession of his prop-
erty until he discharged the lien.
133. See note 108 supra.
134. See note 132 supra.
135. Sanders v. Brooks, 239 Mo. App. 578 (1946).
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The problem becomes more complicated when the plaintiff in
such cases has taken the property under the redelivery bond.
Suppose, in such case, it turns out that the defendant has a lien
on the property. The replevin statute says that when the plain-
tiff fails in his suit and has the property in his possession, the
value of the property will be assessed and judgment entered that
the defendant have a return of the property or its value at his
election together with damages for the taking and detention of
the property." 6 Here the replevin statutes would be inapplicable,
for, upon judgment being rendered for the defendant, if the
statutes be followed, the judgment would be for the full value of
the property to defendant or its return at his election. Mani-
festly, neither element of such a judgment should be made in
such cases, for the defendant is entitled to the value of his lien
only, and he is not entitled to elect whether he will have a return
of the property since the plaintiff as general owner, may say
whether he will keep the property by paying the lien. In such
situations it has been held that:
the forms prescribed in the statute for judgment in replevin
suits apply where one party recovers, and as a result the
other is adjudged to have no interest at all in the property.
Where, however, both parties have an interest in the prop-
erty, the judgment must be made to conform to the rights of
the parties, and these rights may be adjusted in the replevin
suit.137
The court then held in the noted case that the judgment must be
for the value of the lien only, or for a return of the property to
the defendant until such lien be paid.38 If it is found that the
plaintiff is a stranger to the title, judgment may be rendered
for the defendant for the full value and he is then liable over to
the true owner for the value above his lien.239
In this connection it is interesting to note that the statutes on
replevin in justice courts cover the situation where one of the
parties is found to have a special property in the chattel in dis-
pute, while the statutes dealing with replevin in courts of record
are lacking in this respect. Revised Statutes, Missouri, sections
136. MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1798 (1939). *
137. National Theater Supply Co. v. Scovill, 223 Mo. App. 968, 977, 22
S.W. 2d 68, 71 (1929).
138. Accord, Smith v. Tucker, 200 S.W. 707 (Mo. App. 1918); McWherter
v. Randall, 207 Mo. App. 465, 232 S.W. 1070 (1921).
139. Dilworth v. McKelvey, 30 Mo. 149 (1860); Frei v. Vogel, 40 Mo. 150(1867).
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2955 and 2966 both contemplate a special interest in the property
by the defendant. Those sections provide that the jury will find
whether the defendant had (1) the right of property, or (2) the
right of possession, and, after determining this, will find the
value of the property or the value of the possession and award
judgment accordingly.
SUFFICIENCY OF REPLEVIN TO RECOVER THE CHATTEL IN SPECIE.
Since the parties to a replevin suit may, and often do, dispose
of the property pending the outcome of the litigation with rela-
tive immunity, how can a party ever be assured of recovering
the chattel he seeks in specie? Suppose the chattel has some pecu-
liar value to the plaintiff for which reason he desires the return
of the property itself, in which case the alternative judgment for
money which the defendant has the power, and apparently the
right, to force upon plaintiff would be unsatisfactory. There is
nothing in the replevin statutes which prohibits disposition of the
property pending suit. The only penalty, if such it can be termed,
is that the defendant is liable for a conversion of the chattel. It
is true that damages over and above the market value may be
awarded for property having a sentimental value to the plain-
tiff.140 Often, however, no amount of money could adequately
compensate the plaintiff for the loss of such property. What he
wanted was the chattel itself.
Whether the Missouri courts have the power in replevin ac-
tions to act on the person of the defendant in order to assure
return of the chattel in specie is not clear. As noted, there is
nothing in the statutes giving them such power. In In Matter of
Irwin and Bushman,1 41 the lower court had ordered defendants
in the replevin action to deliver up a diamond ring to the court,
pending outcome of the litigation. The defendants refused to sur-
render the ring, whereupon they were jailed for contempt. On
hearing for a writ of habeas corpus, the supreme court ruled
that the lower court was without power to issue that particular
order in a replevin suit, adding that the only action within its
power in such case was an order to deliver the property over to
the sheriff on plaintiff's filing bond for further delivery over to
the plaintiff. The latter order is satisfactory if it can be made
140. Kalinoski v. M. A. Newhouse and Son, 53 S.W.2d 1094 (Mo. App.
1932).
141. 320 Mo. 20, 6 S.W.2d 597 (1928).
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before defendant has disposed of the property. On issuing such
an ordei, the court has the defendant in its power for contempt
citation and he would then dispose of the chattel at great risk.
Thus it appears that plaintiff would be secure if he filed with his
petition an affidavit showing sufficient facts to warrant such an
order from the court. However, the Irwin and Bushman case is
really no precedent for courts in replevin actions to issue such
orders as a matter of course. It will be observed that the order
issued by the court in that case was ruled improper and the
supreme court merely stated that the order for delivery over to
the sheriff would be proper. No case was found in which the
latter order was actually made. Further, in the Irwin and Bush-
man hearing there had been evasive conduct on part of defen-
dants which had antagonized the court. It is submitted that the
replevin statutes might well give the courts express power to act
in exceptional cases to prevent the party in possession from dis-
posing of the property, and to deliver it over to the plaintiff.
Other jurisdictions often have such provisions in their replevin
statutes. For example, Colorado's replevin statutes provide that:
Whenever it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of
the court by the affidavit of the plaintiff or otherwise, that,
the defendant or any other person knowingly conceals the
property sought to be recovered, or having control thereof
refuses to deliver the same to the officer, the justice may
commit such defendant or other person until he or they dis-
close where such property is, or delivers the same to the
officers. 34
2
Of course, if the plaintiff could make out a proper case, the
equity courts could intervene to assure him a return of the chat-
tel. Though no cases were reviewed where a court of equity
ordered the defendant to deliver up a unique chattel to the plain-
tiff, Missouri's equity courts would probably follow the general
rule that, where the chattel which the plaintiff seeks has a pecu-
liar value to him, such as an object of art, equity will decree that
the defendant return the chattel in specie. In such cases equity
will exercise whatever power is necessary over the person of the
defendant to assure return of the chattel to the plaintiff.143 There
142. CoL. STAT. ANx. c. 96, § 126 (1935). Other states have given similar
power to the law courts. See, for instance, New York Civil Practice Act
(1939) §§ 826 and 1094a, which impose restraints on the defendant pending
litigation over personal property.
143. Lang v. Thacher, 48 App. Div. 313, 62 N.Y.Supp. 956 (1900) (draw-
ings); Evans v. Van Hall, 1 Clarke Ch. 22 (N.Y. 1839) (personal letters).
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is no shortage of cases in which equity has decreed the specific
performance of a contract to purchase a chattel having a unique
value to the vendee. It is generally held that where the chattel
which the plaintiff has agreed to purchase is desired for a par-
ticular purpose, and cannot be duplicated anywhere else, and if
his reason for desiring it is such that money would not compen-
sate him, Missouri's equity courts will decree specific perform-
ance of the contract. For instance, in Dennison v. Keasby 44 it
was held that where shares of stock which the plaintiff had con-
tracted to purchase were unavailable in the open market, the
remedy at law was inadequate and equity would decree that those
specific shares be conveyed to the plaintiff. And in Whiting v.
Land and Sheep Co. 45 the court held that the buyer had a right
to specific performance of a contract to deliver shares of corpor-
ate stock when the reason assigned by the plaintiff for desiring
those particular shares was that he would thereby gain a measure
of control over the corporation issuing the stock.
Specific performance of personalty contracts has been decreed
for chattels other than shares of stock. In Boeving v. Vandover"48
the plaintiff placed an order with the defendant automobile
dealer for a new Buick automobile in 1946 when new cars were
scarce and could normally be obtained only on the black market
by paying exorbitant prices. After a long wait the defendant
told the plaintiff he had an automobile for him. When plaintiff
offered to pay for the automobile, he was informed by defendant
that a trade-in of plaintiff's old car as part payment on the new
one would be necessary. Plaintiff refused to do this, whereupon
defendant refused to deliver the new car. Plaintiff filed suit for
specific performance of the contract based on the order he had
placed with the defendant. Final decision was handed down by
the supreme court in 1949 and the decree was that the defendant
convey to the plaintiff a new, 1949 model Buick automobile for
the price stipulated in the original order for a 1946 model Buick.
144. 200 Mo. 408, 98 S.W. 546 (1906); accord, Wood v. Telephone Co.,
223 Mo. 537, 123 S.W. 6 (1909).
145. 265 Mo. 374, 177 S.W. 589 (1915) ; accord, O'Neil v. Webb, 78 Mo.
App. 1 (1898).
146. 218 S.W. 2d 175 (Mo. 1949).
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CONCLUSION.
The preceding discussion shows that the Missouri replevin
law needs at least a careful amendment in some particulars.
Neither the legislature nor the courts have been interested in
securing the actual recovery of a chattel in specie. Yet it would
be easy to provide that the court, upon application of the other
party, should order the party in possession not to dispose of the
chattel pending the litigation, and, upon conclusion of the case
should order the losing party to deliver possession to the winner.
All such orders could easily be enforced through contempt
process. The only objection to them would be that they consti-
tute a use of equity proceedings in a law case, and this could
hardly be seriously maintained in a state which has attempted
so completely to abolish the traditional distinctions between
law and equity. This change seems the more necessary because
the scarcity of equity cases involving chattels suggests that that
remedy is being overlooked.
Secondly, the doubt whether replevin will lie for a chattel the
title to which has passed to the plaintiff under a contract,"1 7
should be removed. It seems hardly arguable that the purchaser
in such situations is entitled to the remedy unless the contract
expressly or impliedly postpones his possessory rights.
The other objections to the present state of the law all have to
do with the assessment of damages. 148 In general, a far more
precise description of the rules of damages to be applied in the
action would be both feasible and beneficial. No standard what-
ever is given to the courts by the legislative provision merely
that damages will be assessed for "the taking and detention" of
the property. This explains, for example, the curious inconsis-
tencies of the rules governing interest which were pointed out
above.249 This can be corrected only by the adoption of more
exact statutory directions based upon the experience revealed in
the cases. Again, limiting the value in trover to the time of tak-
ing even though the chattel fluctuates thereafter,15° while in
147. 62 Mo. 350 (1876).
148. Of course, as pointed out above, the courts are still in confusion
and disagreement as to the propriety of permitting an action of replevin
based on naked possession. This problem, however, is not peculiar to re-plevin but runs througr any possessory action involving either chattels or
realty.
149. See note 116 supra
150. Darling v. Potts, 118 Mo. 506, 24 S.W. 461 (1893); Walker v.
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replevin the value at the time of the trial is given in the same
situation,15'1 makes it the defendant's interest to dispose of the
chattel, if he can, before he is sued thereby decreasing the
amount of damages which can be levied against him. The most
obvious correction of this condition is to adopt a statute giving
the plaintiff in trover the highest value between notice and a
reasonable time thereafter.152 Though a strong case could be
made for a general re-working of the law all through, these fun-
damental changes could be made quite easily and would correct
the more objectionable features of the present practice.
LESLIE E. BRYAN
Boland, 21 Mo. 289 (1855); Ross. v. Fidelity Bank and Trust Co., 115
S.W.2d 148 (Mo. App. 1938).
151. Schnabel v. Thomas, 98 Mo. App. 197, 71 S.W. 1076 (1903).
152. See note 130 supra.
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